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Executive Summary
In the last several years, dramatic failures of the nation’s food safety system have sickened or
killed tens of thousands of Americans, and caused billions of dollars of damages for
producers and distributors of everything from fresh vegetables to granola bars and
hamburger meat. In each case, the outbreak of food-borne illness triggered what can only
be described as a frantic scramble by health officials to discover its source. Inevitably, the
wrong lead is followed or a recall is too late or too narrow to prevent further illnesses, and
the government has to defend itself against withering criticism. Americans expect more
from the experts at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and their counterparts at the
Department of Agriculture, but the simple truth is that they are ill-equipped to deliver.
The food safety system typifies the debilitated state of the entire regulatory system that
Americans rely upon to protect their health, safety, and environment. The five “protector
agencies” – FDA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – all grapple
with hefty responsibilities to protect the American public from constantly evolving hazards.
The agencies have done an adequate job of eliminating or managing the basic hazards of
modern industrial society. Every new car has seatbelts and passive restraints, the use of lead
in gasoline and residential paint has been eliminated, and air quality has improved in many
areas. Unfortunately, this progress has been marred by a series of high-profile failures.
OSHA has failed to prevent musculoskeletal injuries, the leading cause of workplace illness;
billions of consumer products enter the country from foreign manufacturing sites that are
never inspected by product safety specialists; and the EPA is just beginning to map out a
strategy for combating climate change, a threat that could eliminate 40 percent of species
and lead to the relocation of hundreds of millions of people by the turn of the century.
The agencies’ inability to act swiftly and decisively in the last several decades is largely the
result of four problems: severe shortfalls in funding, outdated authorizing statutes, political
interference, and an aging, demoralized civil service. Regulatory dysfunction begins with
funding gaps that defeat agency efforts to fulfill the statutory mandates assigned by
Congress. These shortfalls, which push the agencies into a state of constant default on their
most important missions, are compounded by congressional neglect of its oversight and
reauthorization responsibilities. With two exceptions – the Consumer Product Safety
Commission Improvement Act and the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 – Congress has
made no effort to renew and update the statutes in at least two decades. Compounding
these problems, the protector agencies operate under the watchful eye of White House
political staff who frequently and freely substitute their own judgments for those of agency
staff, offering a back door for special interests disappointed in decisionmaking by agency
experts to exert inappropriate influence, most often behind closed doors. When this
happens, agencies are blocked from providing the protective health, safety, and
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environmental standards that statutes require and the public expects, and agency staff
become demoralized.
The solutions to these problems – statutory amendments, an improved budget process,
decentralized decisionmaking, and civil service reforms – are not simple fixes. But the
alternative is a regulatory system that reverts to a purely reactionary mode, leaving public
health, safety, and environmental protection to the whims of the marketplace.
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Introduction
What, exactly, do we mean by “regulatory dysfunction?” We use it here to connote severe
failures in performance measured by what Congress told the agencies to do. For the
protector agencies, such regulatory dysfunction is manifest in:
1. Late, slow, and even nonexistent efforts to tackle the most obvious and pressing
threats to public health, worker safety and the environment;
2. Failure of the most rudimentary implementation efforts – absence of routine
inspections of manufacturing facilities, delays in writing or renewing permits that
control industrial activities, fatal mistakes in the approval of new drugs and the
monitoring of drugs already on the market, and abdication of responsibility for the
safety of the growing number of imported foods and consumer products; and,
3. The collapse of enforcement of regulatory requirements against consistent violators
and scofflaws.
Unfortunately, all of these cross-cutting problems cripple the effectiveness of each of the
five federal agencies that Congress created to protect health, safety, and the environment.
Despite significant differences in the history, statutory missions, and contemporary agendas
of the five agencies, the symptoms of dysfunction are remarkably similar.
•

OSHA: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, an agency within the

U.S. Department of Labor, is responsible for ensuring a safe and healthy workplace
for almost every private-sector worker. (OSHA does not regulate the selfemployed, family farms, and certain other occupations covered by other federal
agencies.) The agency has the power to promulgate regulations that fall into two
categories: safety regulations, which protect workers from such hazards as
collapsing cranes or dangerous moving parts; and health regulations, which protect
workers from chemical hazards like benzene or chromium. Many of the existing
standards are based on science from the 1940s and 1950s and new standards are
few and far between. Today, OSHA staff spend most of their time on enforcement
or “compliance assistance.” Even so, the agency is so bereft of resources that it
would take more than 200 years to inspect every workplace in the United States.
About half of the states in the United States have their own worker protection
programs, which operate with financial assistance from the federal government so
long as they can show that their programs are at least as protective as the federal
program. OSHA is supposed to ensure the adequacy of these programs, but this
too has become a neglected function.
•

FDA: The Food and Drug Administration is the oldest of the five protector

agencies, and its work may have the most immediate impact on public health, since
it regulates the safety of 80 percent of the food supply (everything but meat,

Regulatory Dysfunction

Page 4

Center for Progressive Reform

poultry, and some farmed fish), as well as all over-the-counter and prescription
drugs, vaccines, medical devices, the national blood supply, veterinary medicines,
and even cosmetics. All told, the products regulated by FDA account for a full 25
percent of U.S. consumer spending. The agency has a variety of regulatory tools at
its disposal, each tied to a particular statutory goal. For instance, to regulate drugs
and devices, FDA uses an “approval” system. For food safety, the agency has
labeling and contamination standards. Unfortunately, these tools are not always
effective: When the agency approved Vioxx, it failed to take adequate steps to
monitor the drug’s use after it hit the market. As a result, between 88,000 and
139,000 Americans suffered Vioxx-related heart attacks or strokes. Various
resource constraints also hamper the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission of
ensuring food safety.
•

NHTSA: Following the publication Ralph Nader’s groundbreaking exposé of the
auto industry, Unsafe at Any Speed, Congress created the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration with the broad responsibility for promoting traffic safety on
the millions of miles of roads that criss-cross the country. The agency addresses
two of the three fundamental causes of automobile crashes – driver behavior and
vehicle safety. (The other cause is the road itself, which falls under the purview of
other officials in the U.S. Department of Transportation.) NHTSA’s efforts to curb
injury rates focus heavily on changing driver behavior ($599 million in grants to
states for behavioral safety programs plus $107 million on behavioral safety
research, versus $121 million on vehicle safety programs). Yet injury rates have
stopped declining in recent years and traffic fatalities remain the number one cause
of death for Americans between the ages of four and 34.

•

EPA: The Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for administering
perhaps the broadest set of congressional mandates, covering everything from the
pesticides and fertilizers used on U.S. crops, to the engineering controls used to
minimize the release of toxics into the air and water, to the quality of the drinking
water that flows out of our faucets. The rules and regulations flow from EPA
headquarters, but once those regulations are in place, much of EPA’s work is
administered and enforced in partnership with officials at state and local
environmental protection agencies. Having long ago addressed those
environmental problems that could be considered “low-hanging fruit” (lead in
gasoline and uncontrolled releases of air toxics), EPA is now faced with secondgeneration environmental concerns that are harder to resolve. For example, tackling
climate change will be a herculean task.

•

CPSC: Congress established the Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1972 to

be the nation’s premier consumer protection agency. It is an independent agency
designed to be led by a bipartisan group of five commissioners appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, but ideological battles over business-friendly
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For every
statistic that

nominees during the Bush Administration resulted in that number dwindling to two,
crippling the agency’s effectiveness. The statute that created the CPSC, the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), granted the agency a broad array of
powerful regulatory tools – from mandatory safety standards to product recalls. Its
jurisdiction covers tens of thousands of products in the U.S. marketplace. A
growing number of those products are imported from foreign countries, making
CPSC’s job of ensuring proper adherence to its safety standards that much more
complex. Eighty percent of toys found in U.S. stores come from China, but CPSC
employs only 15 inspectors nationwide to ensure their safety. In 2007, the “year of
the recall,” literally millions of toys were recalled by their American importers
because they were slathered with lead paint or contained toxic substances that
posed acute threats to children’s health.
To be sure, the five protector agencies have patched together a safety net that has greatly
improved the quality of life in the United States. The rate of injury and death in the
workplace and on U.S. roads has declined with the implementation of OSHA and NHTSA
standards, the quality of food on our tables is generally very good, our medicines are
generally safe, and our water and air is far less polluted than it was in the 1970s – a time
when the Cuyahoga River was so polluted that it caught fire and cities were covered by
dense clouds of pollution. But the safety net has gaping holes. For every statistic that
shows improvements in quality of life resulting from the protector agencies’ work, there is a
grim tale of a dangerous product that should not be in the marketplace or an avoidable
death that leaves us wondering why the government has not done a better job.
This paper will answer that question; at least, to a point. The protector agencies each have
their own problems, but there are some overarching reasons why FDA, OSHA, EPA, CPSC,
and NHTSA are in a dysfunctional state. These problems start with hollow government.
We continually ask agencies to do more and more with less and less, forcing them to make
trade-offs that undermine statutory goals. Then there is the problem of outmoded laws –
laws that did not properly delegate to the agencies sufficient power to achieve statutory
goals of safe workplaces, a safe marketplace, or a clean environment, particularly as these
challenges evolved over the years and as new hazards emerged. But insufficient resources,
weak statutory authority and poor enforcement regimes are just the beginning. Centralized
power in the White House over even the most minute details of regulatory decisionmaking
hinders the expert staff at the protector agencies from pushing bold initiatives to carry out
their statutory obligation to manage health, safety, and environmental hazards. All of these
factors delegitimize, de-emphasize, and demoralize agency staff, ultimately leading to a
vicious cycle of dysfunctional agencies. The problems are serious but redressable, and now
is the time for cross-cutting reforms to reinvigorate the protector agencies.
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Hollow Government: Asking Dysfunctional
Agencies to Do More With Less
The protector agencies are chronically underfunded. For decades, the U.S. population and
workforce have grown, the consumer products industry has ballooned, and threats to the
environment have become increasingly intractable. Yet all the while, the protector agencies’
budgets, staff, and resources have failed to keep pace.
The CPSC is the poster child for agencies that strive to achieve broad statutory mandates
with woefully insufficient resources. It is responsible for ensuring the safety of almost every
durable good that U.S. consumers buy, from lamps to computers. Its jurisdiction covers
more than 15,000 categories of products; or, put another way, it covers everything but food
and drugs; automobiles, boats, and airplanes; alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. The consumer
goods that CPSC regulates are designed, manufactured, and sold through a complex, multibillion dollar international supply chain, yet the agency operates with a staff of just over 400
employees working on a what is, comparatively speaking, a shoestring budget of about $107
million.
CPSC was not always in such dire straits. When the agency was formed, much of the
design, manufacture, and distribution of consumer goods occurred within U.S. borders. In
its heyday during the first ten years of its existence, the agency had about twice as many
employees as it does now (nearly 900 in 1981), and its budget, when adjusted for inflation,
was much higher ($145 million in 1976). But, tragically, as the consumer products industry
grew and spread around the globe, CPSC shrunk. President Reagan and his anti-regulatory
allies in Congress slashed the agency’s budget in the early 1980s, and no Congress or
President since has had the will to reinvigorate the agency. The results are clear in CPSC’s
data: After a 25 percent drop in injury rates during the first five years of the agency’s
existence, the rate leveled off over the next 20 years.1
In recent years, a deluge of high-profile product-safety disasters spurred Congress to
reconsider CPSC’s authority and resources. In the 2008 Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act, Congress mandated specific new requirements for lead and phthalate
content in children’s toys, required mandatory safety testing and certification, expanded
whistleblower protections, and increased penalties for violations of the Act. But the statute
took no meaningful action on the import problem, directing the agency to report back to
Congress on how to deal with this massive problem in 2011.
CPSC’s fate exemplifies many of the hollow-government problems common to all five
protector agencies. Like CPSC, all of the protector agencies have seen their jurisdiction
expand greatly since they were first established. Yet, over the last three decades, CPSC,
OSHA, NHTSA, and EPA have all had to manage their increasing workload with a stagnant
budget. Only FDA has seen meaningful increases in its annual appropriations, but even
those increases are woefully inadequate with respect to food safety.
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Congress is the main culprit behind agencies’ dwindling resources and growing
responsibilities, the root of problem being the legislature’s flawed budget process. The
problem begins with the disconnect between authorizers and appropriators. House and
Senate authorizing committees are responsible for writing the statutes that define the
agencies’ missions and mandates, but they have no formal means for consulting or
establishing accountability with the appropriations committees. This structural flaw
concentrates power over the budget away from the legislators and congressional staff who
have the greatest understanding of the agencies’ inner workings into the hands of legislators
whose viewpoint tends to overlook the protector agencies. Case in point: In 2005, the
House Appropriations subcommittee with power over EPA’s budget had just six staff
(whose attention was split between EPA and a number of other agencies). In contrast, the
House Energy and Commerce Committee (in charge of much of EPA’s authorizing
legislation) had 61 staff.
To make matters worse, the protector agencies are recipients of the discretionary spending
that is getting increasingly squeezed out of the budget. As the population ages and
healthcare costs rise, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security costs take up an increasing
proportion of federal revenues. For good reason, Congress is loath to cut these programs,
which provide daily necessities to millions of Americans. National defense spending and
debt-reduction often get higher priority than the protector agencies, too. In the end, the
protector agencies are left fighting over table scraps. The combined budgets of all five
protector agencies in 2008 was just over $10 billion, or less than one-half of one percent of the
$3.5 trillion budget that Congress approved on April 2, 2009.
Congress is not solely to blame for the
protector agencies’ resource shortages.
The White House, too, deserves some
censure. Regardless of the particular spin
any recent President has put on his annual
budget, the numbers never change much
and the protector agencies continue to get
short shrift. The problem is that OMB is
focused on the wrong questions when it
collects budget requests from the agencies.
Rather than asking the agencies to “trueup” their budgets by developing a list of
statutory mandates, the tasks it needs to
accomplish to achieve those mandates, and
the resources needed to complete those
tasks (in money, employees, and time),
OMB asks them to compose a budget
request based on incremental changes from
previous years’ appropriations.2
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Although the White House might significantly improve the lot of the protector agencies by
submitting budget requests to Congress that reflect the agencies’ true needs (not just their
desired incremental changes from the previous year), the skewed focus of the budget
request is based in large part on the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).3
GPRA instilled in OMB the authority to collect and review annual performance plans
prepared by each federal agency. OMB then took this authority and developed a system
known as PART (for “Performance Assessment Rating Tool”), which was intended to
“identify a program’s strengths and weaknesses to inform funding and management
decisions aimed at making the program more effective.”4 But since Republicans in
Congress have threatened to cut agencies’ budget requests if programs receive bad PART
ratings, the process has encouraged agencies to develop vague goals and the entire process
devolves into a meaningless charade. In fact, the charade conceals a more dangerous
problem: Since agencies’ budget requests are based on their PART reports, their budget
processes begin and end with goals that are designed to avoid budget cuts, rather than to
secure the full appropriations they need to accomplish their statutory missions.
While PART and the congressional budget process are the roots of the protector agencies’
resource problems, the growth of the problems is due in large part to anti-regulatory
zealots’ manipulation of PART and the appropriator/authorizer divide. A bad PART rating
is as likely to be a result of insufficient resources as it is a reason to take money or
personnel away from a program. But when the appropriations committee is separated from
the authorizing agency that better understands the needs of the agency, members of
appropriations committee who want to shrink the government have a much easier time
making their case.
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Holes in the Safety Net: Outmoded Laws
The protector agencies’ ability to respond to all of the health and environmental threats in
their domain is also constrained by laws that were conceived at a time when Congress had a
fundamentally different understanding of both the threats to be regulated and the agencies’
capacity to address those threats. In the intervening years, knowledge about science, public
administration, and regulatory policy has evolved, but the statutes that set the boundaries on
the protector agencies’ powers have remained largely the same.
For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) requires the manufacturer of a new
chemical substance to tell EPA what it knows about the risk the substance poses for people
and the environment prior to distributing and selling it. (This is called a “premanufacture
notice.”) EPA also has the authority to issue “test rules,” which are administrative orders
that force manufacturers to design and conduct tests on a chemical’s toxicity.
Unfortunately, both of these provisions have significant shortcomings. A manufacturer can
simply submit a premanufacture notice without any toxicity data as long as it has not yet
done any testing. Indeed, only 15 percent of those notices arrive at EPA with any health or
test data.5 More problematic, though, is that Congress drafted TSCA’s test rule provision in
a way that puts EPA in a classic Catch-22: EPA can only exercise its power to issue a test
rule after establishing that it needs more information about a chemical because the chemical
“may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” Of course,
establishing the potential unreasonable risk is only possible if EPA has information
pertaining to risk in the first place, which it manifestly does not have, otherwise there would
be no need for the test rule.
The reason that a fundamental section of a major environmental protection statute includes
such a fatal flaw can be linked back to the way Congress operates in enacting protective
legislation. Congress has organized itself into a complex of specialized committees and
subcommittees, whose membership is largely self-selected. Legislators with a particular
interest in a certain area (e.g., environmental protection or worker safety) will gravitate
toward the committees with jurisdiction over that area. Thus the committees, which are the
true proving grounds for any piece of legislation, are populated largely by “preference
outliers”6 who are the most receptive to overtures from special interest groups with wellheeled lobbying divisions.
But more than Congress’s structural attributes, the legislative process is the source of delay
in reauthorizing important public health statutes. A dizzying number of steps must be
taken to move a piece of legislation through committee markups, onto the floor of
Congress, through the amendment process, into conference committee, and, eventually, to
the President’s desk. Each stage in this process provides a determined minority with the
power to kill – or at least maim – a disfavored piece of legislation. And with the powerful
economic and industrial forces that typically align in opposition to health, safety, and
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environmental legislation, each of these “vetogates” in the legislative process is a major
hurdle for the legislation’s proponents to overcome.
For major legislation that is almost preordained to make it out of committee and to the
Senate floor, the threat of a filibuster is the most daunting vetogate. In fact, as the current
Congress considers health care reform, climate change legislation, and new labor laws, the
proponents of these measures often claim that they are legislating to the preferences of the
one Senator whose opposition is just malleable enough to ensure a 60th vote for cloture.
The power of special interests to shape health and safety regulation is perhaps most evident
in the weak enforcement provisions written into the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act) and the consumer protection statutes. The potential criminal penalties for killing
an endangered species are actually more stringent than the criminal penalties for willful
violations of workplace safety and health standards that lead to a worker’s death. A
conviction for a knowing violation of the Endangered Species Act can bring a fine of
$50,000 and a year in prison,7 whereas penalties for a first-time conviction for a willful
violation of the OSH Act that results in a worker’s death are limited to $10,000 and six
months in jail.8 Perhaps most telling, “citizen suit” provisions that empower anyone in the
United States to act as a private attorney general to enforce environmental laws are
common, but the same is not true for worker and consumer protection laws like the OSH
Act, Consumer Product Safety Act, and National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
Besides weak enforcement regimes, the other legal constraint on agencies that can be linked
directly to congressional structure and process is ambiguous statutory commands. Too
often, legislators avoid the most thorny issues in a piece of legislation, saving themselves
from a bitter political dispute by punting the issue to the agencies. Though it is often done
under the guise of letting the non-political, technocratic experts within the agency decide on
the best policy, in reality, agency decisionmakers are subject to at least the same amount of
interest group crossfire as Members of Congress; they just do not have to run for
reelection. The classic example of ambiguous statutory language that Congress cannot
muster the will to fix is the central jurisdictional question in the Clean Water Act. The 1972
Clean Water Act gave EPA the power to regulate the discharge of pollutants into all
“navigable waters” in the United States, which were defined as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.”9 Exactly what “the waters of the United States”
comprise is a question that continues to confound the agency, particularly as it works with
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to preserve the integrity of our nation’s wetlands. Yet,
on numerous occasions, Congress has failed to pass legislation that would provide
clarification.10
Notwithstanding vetogates and legislative inertia, some health, safety, and environmental
statutes have made it through Congress and have been signed into law by the President in a
relatively strong form, only to be weakened or hampered with unwieldy analytical
requirements by the courts.
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The OSH Act is a prime example. The law gives OSHA the authority to promulgate
permissible exposure limits (PELs) for toxins released into workplace air. The agency was
empowered to set PELs using expedited procedures within the first two years of its
existence, in order to tackle the most hazardous workplace conditions quickly. But after that
first phase of rulemaking, Congress expected OSHA to update PELs to conform with
emerging science using standard administrative procedures. This scheme might have worked
smoothly but for the Benzene case,11 where the Supreme Court saddled OSHA with the
burden of quantifying a significant risk posed by each toxin before the agency regulates the
chemical under the OSH Act. This requirement was not imposed by Congress in the statute
but rather crafted out of whole cloth by the high court in 1980. Just over a decade after the
Benzene decision, the Eleventh Circuit dealt OSHA a second body blow. After the Benzene
case, OSHA’s progress in setting new standards had slowed to a trickle, but it made an
ambitious attempt to update hundreds of health standards in one massive rulemaking. The
Eleventh Circuit invalidated this approach, holding that OSHA’s recitation of scientific
evidence regarding the health threats posed by each chemical was not enough – the agency
also had to determine the precise, numerical risk posed by each chemical. Nearly 400 new
PELs were set aside, and OSHA has since resigned itself to undertaking the arduous task of
precisely quantifying individual chemical risks before suggesting new standards. The burden
on agency staff is reflected in the fact that OSHA has only finalized two new standards
since 1997.
None of this is to say that courts should abstain from reviewing agency actions – judicial
oversight is a powerful mechanism for ensuring accountability in the regulatory process – or
that the legislative process should somehow be less susceptible to compromise. Rather, the
central theme here is that a functional regulatory system is fundamentally dependent on
flexible statutes and a Congress that is willing to constantly reassess the adequacy of the
agencies’ governing statutes.
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Political Interference:
Backdoor Subversion of Agency Expertise
On a daily basis, agency staff are engaged in the important, if mundane, analysis of science
and policy that enables them to understand and respond to the threats facing workers,
consumers, and the environment. Unfortunately, over the last 30 years, this work, which
Congress specifically delegated to agencies because of the specialized training and expertise
of their staff, has increasingly come under strict oversight and control by the political
denizens of the White House. This centralization of the regulatory decisionmaking process
is not unique to Republican or Democratic administrations. It stems from the perennial and
bipartisan electioneering strategy of decrying the unwieldy federal bureaucracy and
promising to rein it in with new and innovative management schemes. Each successive
president has invented new ways to insinuate White House staff and political appointees
into the rulemaking process by establishing new procedural hurdles that agencies must
negotiate before finalizing protective regulations. In addition to undermining Congress’s
goal of regulating health and safety based on expert analysis of the science and policy, the
centralization of regulatory decisionmaking inevitably slows the regulatory process without
necessarily improving regulations.
The evolution of EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) offers a poignant
example of how centralization of the regulatory process can impede beneficial regulation.
In 1985, EPA staff determined that there was a need to develop a centralized database of all
the various chemical risk assessments that were being developed around the agency’s
program and regional offices. These risk assessments were the cornerstones of regulatory
decisions ranging from how to control toxins in the air and water, to how clean the soil
would have to be at Superfund sites around the country. From 1985 until 2004, EPA
scientists in the Office of Research and Development (ORD) coordinated the addition of
new chemical assessments to the IRIS database. But in 2004, John Graham, Administrator
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA, an office in the White House
OMB), initiated a complete redesign of the IRIS assessment process that would eventually
give OMB a powerful voice in every stage of the scientific assessment process.12
Congressional staff have uncovered evidence that individuals at OMB went so far as to
make editorial comments on specific chemical profiles, “comments that would have changed
the import and meaning of the scientific findings” made by EPA scientists.13
Since the White House became intimately involved in the IRIS assessment process, EPA
staff have struggled to cope with the added political pressures. Only a few chemical profiles
are added to the database each year, ultimately hampering EPA’s ability to develop secondgeneration air pollution regulations and cleanup standards for major Superfund sites.
The IRIS example is a powerful demonstration of how the White House has infiltrated the
aspects of the regulatory system that are clearly within the realm that Congress expects
should be insulated from political pressure. Chemical profiles in the IRIS database are “pre-
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regulatory” documents that do not necessarily dictate the content of EPA regulations. They
answer some of the scientific questions that EPA decisionmakers will ultimately consider in
light of other scientific evidence and policy considerations, but they do not dictate even
minimum levels of pollution control. Simply put, White House involvement in the
development of IRIS profiles is a power grab that discredits EPA’s scientific experts.
During a congressional hearing following the Obama Administration’s decision to retain
centralized review of the IRIS decisions, both the the Chairman (Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC))
and the Ranking Member (Rep. Paul Broun (R-GA)) of a House science subcommittee
expressed serious reservations about political interference with the IRIS process.14
Disturbing in its own right, the IRIS example only hints at the increasingly complex and
opaque procedural requirements that presidents and Congress have imposed. Today,
agencies might have to go through more than 100 discrete analytical steps before they can
adopt a regulation.15
Executive Order 12,866 holds the dubious distinction of being the main conduit through
which the White House exerts control over the federal regulatory process. Since it was first
signed by President Reagan in 1981, the Order has been upheld (and slightly modified) by
each successive President. It requires agencies to draft a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA)
for each rule that it proposes to enact, and to submit the RIA to the Director of OMB
prior to finalizing the rule. The main thrust of the RIA is supposed to be a cost-benefit
analysis of the proposed rule (a questionable end in itself), but the White House and OMB
have added more and more analytical mandates over the years.
Requiring agencies to undertake the many analyses established through Executive Order is
bad enough, as it forces the agencies to divert resources from assessing manageable hazards
to endless regulatory review, but OMB makes things worse by using these tools for more
than just oversight – they use RIA review as a way to demand substantive changes to
regulations developed by expert agencies. OMB posts on its website some basic
information about meetings it holds with non-government entities (trade associations, labor
groups, environmentalists) on particular rules that it is reviewing, so it is not hard to
connect the dots between the special interest groups’ desired outcomes and OMB’s requests
for agencies to change their rules.
OIRA is the primary choke point for new regulations as they go through the E.O. 12,866
review process, but there are numerous other White House offices that the protector
agencies must accommodate before they can finalize a new regulation. For example, one
attempt to characterize White House involvement in EPA rulemaking revealed that as many
as 19 White House offices were involved in reviewing EPA rules.16 And a Pulitzer Prizewinning series in the Washington Post described in detail how Vice President Richard Cheney
became intimately involved in many aspects of U.S. energy policy during the Bush years,
wrangling from the hands of expert agencies decisions about oil and gas drilling, power
plant regulation, and other questions best left to the regulatory experts.17
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Centralized regulatory decisionmaking contributes to regulatory dysfunction mainly in terms
of its opportunity costs. As explained above, the protector agencies have been tasked with
congressional mandates that would be difficult to accomplish with resources many times
greater than what they have. So every person-hour and every dollar spent complying with
analytical requirements or resolving issues put forward in the recursive RIA reviews is a
person-hour or a dollar not spent analyzing emerging hazards or advancing other regulatory
priorities. The costs of delay are paid out continually by workers and consumers whose
health and well-being would benefit from protective regulation, not to mention the
environment.
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Discredited and Demoralized:
A Battered Federal Workforce
By this point it is clear, the public servants who work tirelessly to protect U.S. workers,
consumers, and the environment are themselves in need of protection. Insufficient
resources, growing responsibilities, numerous pre-rulemaking procedural requirements,
overweening White House oversight, and perennial complaints about “bureaucratic red
tape” all contribute to a demoralized federal workforce. Sadly, the troubles infect every level
of the agencies.
“I have never seen morale at a lower point than we currently have in EPA.
Good scientists are leaving because they can no longer put up with all the
micro-management that is heaped on them in lieu of effective
administrative leadership.”18
— Anonymous scientist from EPA’s Office of Research and Development, in response
to a survey on scientific integrity sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists
“[Y]ou really felt uneasy about being federal employees. People would look
at you as if you had cancer.”19
— Anonymous former government technical specialist, in an interview about the
emotional impacts of “bureaucracy bashing” during elections
These quotations underscore the notion that federal employees’ consternation stems
primarily from a feeling that their hard work, dedication, and expertise are regularly
marginalized by politicians. To be sure, this problem was not unique to the Bush
Administration, nor was it a function of Republican control of the White House. President
Clinton famously clashed with FDA over the agency’s proposal to provide federal funding
for needle exchange programs, ignoring strong evidence of the programs’ public health
benefits due to a political concern about “looking soft” on drug abuse. Regardless of who
controls the White House, federal employees usually take pride in the fact that they were
hired for their knowledge and expertise, which they continue to cultivate through long
careers in service of an agency mission with which they identify (the average federal civilian
employee has been on the job for more than 16 years).20
A demoralized federal workforce threatens to add to regulatory dysfunction on two
important fronts. First, it is difficult to retain workers who feel undervalued. Seventy-six
percent of the Senior Executive Service (SES), a cadre of career employees who operate at
the edge of the merit-based and political appointments systems, with the job stability of the
former and the management power of the latter, are eligible to retire in 2012 and more than
a third of them are expected to exercise the option. With the disparity between federal pay
and private-sector pay increasing for many important jobs, talented younger workers are also
heading for greener pastures.21 The second issue, which exacerbates the negative
consequences of growing gaps in the federal workforce, is that demoralized workers who
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remain on the job are less likely to be strong ambassadors who will attract the best and
brightest new employees.
The potential problems caused by a “brain drain” at the entry-level and SES ends of the
workforce spectrum will only be magnified if another chronic problem is not resolved — a
significant increase in the number of managers between front-line civil servants (e.g., food
safety inspectors or OSHA compliance safety and health officers) and the people whose
decisions actually carry some legal heft (e.g., the FDA Commissioner or OSHA
Administrator).
Paul Light, the prominent political scientist who coined the term “thickening” to describe
the increasing distance between front-line civil servants and agency heads, found that
between 1960 and 1995, the number of layers of senior-level appointments at federal
agencies tripled, and the number of occupants of each layer grew geometrically.22 Extra
layers of management, of course, mean extra rounds of review for everything that a frontline civil servant does, which can actually create disincentives for employees who have lost
confidence that their efforts will survive the gauntlet of duplicitous reviews.
This particular form of regulatory dysfunction is more than just an incidental concern about
federal employee satisfaction, it is also a matter of public health and safety. With agency
budgets staying relatively stagnant, more managers results in fewer inspectors and scientists
investigating potential hazards. FDA’s medical device approval system is one example of a
suffering program. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that FDA
does not review all high-risk medical devices through its most stringent premarket approval
process.23 Career staff who work in the device approval office have alleged that political
interference in the device approval process is rampant and brushed under the table by
managers who are more concerned with protecting political higher-ups than protecting
patients with risky devices.24
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A New Path: Leading the Dysfunctional
Agencies to a More Functional Future
Americans expect their government to protect them – from unscrupulous lenders and bear
markets they cannot control, from terrorist threats and natural disasters they cannot foresee,
and from employers and product manufacturers whose duties to shareholders do not
adequately capture their duties to their employees and customers. Americans also expect
clean air, clean water, and an environment that is protected for future generations. While
the protector agencies have done a decent job at making inroads toward a truly safe and
healthy society, their efforts to this point have been concentrated mainly on picking the lowhanging fruit. OSHA adopted basic health and safety standards that reflected early (1940s
to 1950s) science about those hazards. EPA required enough water pollution controls to
prevent rivers from burning. And NHTSA has ensured that all new cars come with some
sort of passive restraint system. But the regulatory system that produced these protections
and delivered some immediately positive results is ill-equipped to handle the current
generation of hazards. The hollowed-out agencies are still operating under laws that are not
well-designed to handle these hazards, increasingly centralized decisionmaking has slowed
the regulatory process to the point where it is almost non-responsive to emerging threats,
and the federal workforce is being stretched to the brink of failure.
It is time that Congress, the White House, and agency political heads stop tinkering with
minor adjustments to the regulatory process and start working toward fundamental changes
that will revitalize the protector agencies.

A Positive Vision of Government
The first thing the agencies need is a citizenry, legislature, and Executive Branch who share a
positive vision of government. To his credit, President Obama is leading the way. Instead
of resorting to the hackneyed tactic of bureaucracy bashing, he used his 2008 presidential
campaign to espouse an affirmative view of the role of government in our lives:
Now, understand, I don’t believe that government can or should try to
solve all our problems. You don’t believe that either. But I do believe that
government should do that which we cannot do for ourselves—protect us
from harm; provide a decent education for all children—invest in new
roads and new bridges, in new science and technology.25
Polls indicate that President Obama’s depiction of our shared vision of government is
accurate: A majority of Americans support broad government intervention to help us deal
with issues ranging from greenhouse gas emissions26 to health care.27
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But Americans have a longstanding love/hate relationship with government. That is not
surprising. For years, politicians have railed against “red tape” and “bureaucracy,” painting a
portrait of government employees indifferent to agency missions, lazy, and incompetent.
The truth, however, is that many of those politicians helped create the problem, forcing
agencies to operate under severe resource constraints and under suffocating pressures from
the White House, Congress, and special interest groups. A more honest portrayal of the
problem would allow Americans to better understand these pressures, which would, in turn,
be a first step toward crafting progressive solutions to the problems.

Adequate Resources
The protector agencies need resources sufficient to meet their long-term needs, based on a
“true-up” that asks them to provide best estimates of the resources necessary to properly
meet their legal mandates. The first step toward achieving this goal will be an intensive
process. Each agency will have to develop an accurate and meaningful list of broad
statutory mandates and all of the tasks that it must accomplish to fulfill those mandates.
No doubt, the budget numbers that agencies would derive through this process would vastly
exceed current appropriations. Just think of the personnel CPSC and FDA would have to
hire to properly inspect the products shipped to the United States from foreign countries
with weak regulatory systems. With a Congress that is inherently skeptical of agencies
requesting more money and a White House that has other priorities, agencies’ “true-up”
budgets are unlikely to elicit immediate budget increases. But at least it will give them a
baseline that has more meaning than the current baseline (previous years’ budgets).

New Accountability Mechanisms
Congress and the President need to re-think the accountability mechanisms they use to
judge agency performance. Agencies should be required to adopt “positive metrics,” which,
like “true-up” budgets, are fundamentally tied to agencies’ statutory mandates. With the
guidance of independent experts, agencies should develop comprehensive lists of statutory
mandates and the tasks associated with those mandates. So, for instance, FDA is supposed
to monitor the safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals and medical devices that it has
approved for sale to the public. A positive metric to measure the agency’s progress (one
that FDA has already used) would be to calculate the percentage of adverse event reports
that hospitals, doctors, patients, or manufacturers have filed with the agency but have not
been reviewed by the staff in a timely and systematic way.28 Positive metrics should lay out
the who, what, and when of the tasks that support agencies’ achievement of their statutory
missions. Those elements will help Congress and other resource managers identify the
causes of regulatory shortfalls.
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Decentralized Decisionmaking
Finally, we need to ensure that agency staff are treated with the respect they need to
accomplish their mission, by decentralizing decisionmaking authority and creating a federal
workforce where career civil servants have significant impact on the development of
regulations.
The best way to accomplish these goals is to end the practice of having OMB review every
agency rule. Executive Order 12,866, which is the primary basis for OMB review, embodies
a basic distrust of agencies and their staff, and it should be abolished. At the same time,
there need to be limits on how far political appointees can burrow into agency management
structures. While it is important for the President to have oversight of agencies through
high-level political appointees, congressionally mandated limits on political appointments
could improve agency morale and lead to stronger resistance to improper political
pressure.29

Conclusion
Since their creation, the five protector agencies have struggled to achieve their goals of
protecting public health, welfare, and the environment in the face of Congresses and
presidential administrations that have alternated between being neglectful and outright
hostile to their missions. With limited resources and a platoon of political appointees
second-guessing their every move, agency staff have had difficulty regulating industries that
have become increasingly adept at evading existing regulations and staunching the flow of
new regulations. The changing nature of the American workplace, globally distributed
product design and supply chains, and emerging risks from new chemicals and technologies
have made it imperative that Congress and the Executive Branch begin to design a nextgeneration regulatory system that truly empowers the protector agencies.
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